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Abstract
This paper examines the eect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of
common external taris (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible
cross-border lobbying and by endogenizing tari formation in a political economic model
for the determination of CETs. The latter allows us to consider asymmetries among the
member nations in their susceptibilities to lobbying. We also consider asymmetries in the
inuence of the member nations in CU-wide decision-making. A central nding of this paper
is that, in the absence of economic asymmetry, the CET rises monotonically with the degree
of asymmetry in country inuences if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying.
If inuences are the same, the CET also rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry
in susceptibilities. These results hold irrespective of whether the lobby groups in the two
member countries cooperate or work non-cooperatively.
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The importance of lobbying in economic policymaking in general cannot be overstated. There
are many alternative approaches in modeling such lobbying activities (see Rodrik, 1995,
for a survey), including the directly unproductive rent-seeking activities (DUPs) approach
(Bhagwati, 1982), the tari-formation function approach (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982), the
political support function approach (Hillman, 1982), the campaign contribution approach
(Magee et al., 1989), and the political contributions approach (Grossman and Helpman,
1994).
In particular, the role of lobbying in formulating and forming a preferential trading area
and a customs union (CU) has been analyzed extensively.1;2 Dierent researchers have used
various approaches to model political economy. For example, Cadot et al. (1999) present
a political economy model following the Grossman and Helpman (1994) approach. On the
other hand, Panagariya and Findlay (1996), Richardson (1994), and Bandyopadhyay and
Wall (1999), among others, follow the DUP approach, which also incorporates the tari-
formation approach of Findlay and Wellisz (1982) that assumes an exogenously specied
tari-generating function. The rst goal of our paper is to generalize the DUP approach by
endogenizing tari formation.
Analyzing lobbying introduces additional interesting issues when economic polices are
made by a group of governments. One such example is the determination of common ex-
ternal taris (CETs) in a CU, which is decided by all members of the CU together and
1There has been a proliferation of preferential trading agreements worldwide. Prominent among them are
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU). In the former arrangement,
member nations trade freely among themselves but set taris on non-members independently. This is an
example of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). On the other hand, the EU is organized along the lines of a
CU, where, in addition to intra-bloc free trade, the members set a common tari on non-members (i.e.,
the common external tari (CET)). The CET is determined jointly by the member nations, with members
having dierent levels of inuence on the decision-making.
2The literature on the economics of CU and FTA is not new (see, for example, Viner, 1950). There has
been renewed interest in the subject (see, for example, Riezman, 1979; Gatsios and Karp, 1991 and 1995;
Krishna, 1998; Bond et al.; 2004, Raimondos-Mller and Woodland, 2006; Abrego et al., 2006; Melatos and
Woodland, 2007a and 2007b.)
1applies to all individual member nations. Some economists are concerned that the process
of determination of CETs may lead to more ineciencies by encouraging cooperation among
country-specic lobby groups that may also become international in scope and engage in
cross-border lobbying (see, for example, Schi and Winters, 2003).3 In fact, cross-border
lobbying has become widespread, particularly in the EU. Organizations such as EuroCom-
merce, EuropaBio (European Association for Bioindustries), and Friends of Europe are ex-
tremely active in EU-wide lobbying. Bandyopadhyay and Wall (1999) present a model of
cross-border lobbying of the DUP type to compare FTA and CU taris. In their model, tari
formation is exogenous, as mentioned above. The second goal of our paper is to introduce
cross-border lobbying for the determination of CETs in a CU, alongside endogenous tari
formation.
The third and nal goal of our paper is to consider the eect of political asymmetries on
CETs. We nd dierent treatment of asymmetries in the literature: Saggi (2006) examines
the eect of cost asymmetries among FTA and CU member nations; Bandyopadhyay and
Wall (1999) examine how asymmetries in the inuence of member countries in CU decision-
making aect the dierences between FTA and CU taris. In this paper, we consider not
only asymmetries in the inuence of the member countries on CU decision-making on CET,
but also the eect of asymmetries in the susceptibility of each member nation's government
to cross-border and within-border lobbying on CET. The latter type of asymmetry can
be considered here because of the endogenization of tari formation. We consider three
scenarios. First, we assume that the lobby groups in the two member countries cooperate
and lobby jointly. Second, we assume that the lobby groups do not cooperate and lobby
individually. Finally, we consider a situation where cross-border lobbying is not allowed.
3Cross-border lobbying is not uncommon even outside CUs. A recent contribution by Gawande et al.
(2006) nds that foreign lobbies play an empirically signicant role in the determination of U.S. taris.
Allowing for cross-border lobbying, Grossman and Helpman (1995, Appendix) nd that FTAs may be more
dicult to implement, because now a lobby can block the agreement not only by lobbying its own government
but also by approaching the other member governments.
2The next section sets up the basic framework under cooperation between the lobby
groups. Section 3 then examines the eect of political and economic asymmetries on the
CET. In section 4, we reexamine the issues under two scenarios: (i) when cross-broder lob-
bying is not allowed (section 4.1), and (ii) when the lobby groups do not cooperate (section
4.2). Some concluding remarks are made in section 5.
2 The Theoretical Framework
For simplicity, we consider a CU with two members, A and B. The rest of the world is C.
There is one good, which we call \CU importable," that is imported from C by A and B
and subject to a CET t, which is decided by the CU jointly. This decision is inuenced by
lobbying from the producers of this good in countries A and B. Given the prevalence of
cross-border lobbying, as mentioned in the introduction, we rst assume that the producers
in the two countries cooperate with each other and lobby governments in both A and B
jointly. In section 4.2, we relax this assumption and consider non-cooperative lobbying.
We assume lobbying is of the DUP type. Domestic producers of the CU importable in
country i spend a total amount of hi (in units of some scarce resources) on lobbying both
governments. Because this lobbying is socially unproductive, it entails a social welfare loss
of the amount hi in country i (i = A;B). Consumers' surplus, domestic prots plus tari
revenue, in country i is aected by the level of CET t; we denote it by Si(t) with S00
i < 0. We
assume that country i's government cares about not only social welfare, given by Si(t) hi,
but also the net total income of the lobby group.
Net prots of producers from countries A and B are given by
i(t)   hi; i = A;B; (1)
where i(t) satised 0
i > 0 and 00
i  0.
3Let hj be the total amount of lobbying which country j's government is subjected to.
Because each government accepts lobbying from producers in both countries and the two
producers act cooperatively and lobby jointly, the net income of the lobby group is
A(t) + B(t)   (hA + hB) = A(t) + B(t)   (h
A + h
B);
since hA + hB = hA + hB.
As for the eect of lobbying, we follow the political support function approach suggested
by Hillman (1982). The key assumption underlying this function is that the weight attached
to the income of the lobby group is larger than the weight attached to the income or welfare
of people who do not lobby. Thus, the objective function of the government in country i is
given by
G
i = Si(t)   hi + 
i[A(t) + B(t)   (h
A + h
B)]; i = A;B; (2)
where i > 0 is the extra weight attached to the net income of the lobby group by the
government of country i. The rst two terms represent social welfare, and the last term is
the additional importance attached to the lobby group's income in the government's objective
function. Because the two rms lobby together and each government cares to some extent
about the income of the lobbyists, it is assumed that the government cannot discriminate
between the two individual lobbyists. As a result, foreign prot is assigned the same weight
as domestic prot in each government's objective function. In section 4.2, we consider a
situation where lobbyists do not cooperate and each government can discriminate between
the two lobby groups.
We endogenize the tari-formation function by making the reasonable assumption that
the weight i is an increasing function of the amount of lobbying country i's government
receives. In particular, we assume

A = (1 + ")(h
A); and 
B = (1   ")(h
B); (3)
4where the parameter 1 + " (1   ") represents country A (B) government's susceptibility to
lobbying. That is, a higher value of " implies a higher degree of asymmetry in the countries'
susceptibilities. Starting from " = 0 (the case of symmetry), an increase in the value of "
implies that country A becomes more (and country B becomes less) susceptible to lobbying.
We assume that 0 > 0 and 00 < 0.4 The assumptions made so far are formally stated as
Assumption 1 S00
j < 0, 0
j(t) > 0, 00
j(t)  0, 0(hj) > 0, 00(hj) < 0 (j = A;B).
Having introduced most of the important variables and functions, we proceed to the
solution of the optimal level of CETs. We consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, domestic
producers decide on their lobbying levels by maximizing their joint prots. In stage 2, the CU
authority decides on the level of CET by maximizing a weighted sum of the two governments'
objective functions. We use backward induction to obtain a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
We describe the two stages, starting with the second stage, in the following two subsections.
2.1 Tari Determination by the Customs Union
We assume that the CU authority maximizes a weighted sum of the individual member
governments' objective functions to nd the optimal value of the CET t. That is, the
problem facing the CU authority is
max
t G
CU   G
A(t;hA;hB;h
A;h




where GA and GB are dened in (2) and  and (1 ) are the weights given to the objective
function of country A and B respectively. We take  to represent country A's relative
inuence in the CU decision-making process. A country's relative inuence on decision-
making typically depends on a number of factors. In the EU such factors include a country's
4At the end of section 3, we shall discuss how the results would change if () was a convex function.
5contributions to the EU budget which in turn is closely related to tari revenue generated
in that country.5 The length of membership in the EU is another factor.














0 = 0; (4)
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For the second-order condition to be satised,  must be negative. Formally,
Assumption 2  < 0.
Since we assumed that S00
i < 0 and 00
i  0 for i = A;B (assumption 1), the above assumption
puts an upper bound on the degree of convexity of the  functions. From assumptions 1
and 2, it follows that @t=@hA > 0 and @t=@hB > 0. In other words, in (4) we have endoge-
nously determined the tari-formation function, which is typically imposed exogenously in
the literature.
Having described the second stage of the game, we now explain the rst stage, which
determines the levels of lobbying activities.
5A country is allowed to keep a small proportion (approximately 10%) of tari revenue to cover the costs
of collection of taris on imports.
62.2 Determination of Lobbying Levels
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the producers of the CU importables in the two
countries maximize their joint net prots in determining the levels of lobbying activities.
Formally, the optimizing problem facing them is
max
hA;hB 
CU  A(t) + B(t)   (h
A + h
B);
subject to the reaction function given by (4).








i   1 = 0; i = A;B: (7)
The two equations in (7) and (4) together determine the endogenous variables hA; hB,
and t. This completes the description of the theoretical framework; we next derive some
properties of the equilibrium.
3 Political Asymmetry and CET
In this section, we examine the eect of political asymmetries | that is, changes in the




A) = (1   )(1   )
0(h
B): (8)
From (8), we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 hA 






The proof follows directly from (8) and the assumption that 00 < 0 (assumption 1). As
a corollary of lemma 1, we get:
7(i) When " = 0, we have hA 
< hB according as  
< 1=2, and
(ii) when  = 1=2, hA 
< hB according as " 
< 0:
From lemma 1 it also follows that (a) when " < 0, hA can be lower than hB when  > 1=2,
and (b) when  < 1=2, hA can be lower than hB when " > 0.
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A) = : (10)
Equations (4), (8) and (10) together determine the endogenous variables hA, hB and t.




































where the parameters D, E and F, and the derivation of (11) are provided in appendix I. In
order for the second-order conditions to be satised, we must have 1 + DF > 0 and E > 0.
Let us rst of all consider the case where asymmetries between the two countries are only
in the political arena and there are no economic asymmetries, i.e.,  6= 1=2 and " 6= 0 and
SA(t)  SB(t). In this case, the rst two terms on the right hand side of (11) drop out. The
third term is positive if and only if  > 0, i.e., (1 + ")(hA) > (1   ")(hB). When " = 0,
this condition is satised if and only if  > 1=2. In addition, if (h) = h with  2 (0;1), the
fourth term is also positive if and only if  > 1=2. These results are summarized formally
in the following proposition.
8Proposition 1 When (h) = h with  2 (0;1) and " = 0 and when economic asymmetries
are absent, an increase in asymmetry in political inuences of the two member countries (i.e.,
either an increase in  from  > 1=2 or a decrease in  from  < 1=2) will unambiguously
increase the equilibrium value of the CET.
Similar conclusions can be drawn when the asymmetry is only with respect to the sus-
ceptibility parameter ", i.e., when  = 1=2 and " 6= 0.
When " = 0, if  exceeds 1=2, we know from Lemma 1 that hA exceeds hB. Thus, (hA)
exceeds (hB), and a rise in  must raise the weight attached to marginal industry prot 0
in equation (4). Under economic symmetry [i.e., SA(t) = SB(t)  S(t)], this has the eect of
raising the marginal benet of the CET in equation (4) without aecting the marginal cost
S0(t). Thus, the CET must rise. The mechanism is the following. The composite weight
attached to marginal industry prot in (4) is a weighted average of the lobbying functions
() of the two nations. If at the initial equilibrium (hA) exceeds (hB), as is the case
when  > 1=2, then a rise in  gets a higher weight [i.e., (hA) ] than the concomitant fall
in (1   ) [weighted by (hB)]. As a result, the composite weight must rise, raising the
marginal benet of granting CET.
There is also a second round eect via a change in the lobbying levels themselves. From
(5) and (7) it is clear that the rise in  will also raise the marginal benet of lobbying the
government in country A. On the other hand, the marginal benet of lobbying country B's
government falls. For the functional form (h) = h; [ 2 (0;1)] , we can establish that the
rise in hA dominates the fall in hB . The mechanism is the following: 0(h) changes more
slowly for higher values of h [since 000 > 0]. Thus, the change in 0(hA) is slower than that
0(hB). Therefore, as  rises, hA has to rise to a greater degree (than the fall in hB ) to revert
the marginal benet from lobbying (which is scaled by 0) to the marginal cost of lobbying.
The rise in total lobbying adds to the rise in the CET.
9Finally, a third eect is present when the prot function is strictly convex. In this case,
the rst-round rise in t raises 0, which changes the magnitudes of the eects mentioned
above. However, as we show analytically, this eect does not overturn our ndings.
Note that in proposition 1 we only consider one type of political asymmetry. If both
types co-exist, then in view of the remarks made after lemma 1, it is possible that increasing
 beyond 1=2 (i.e., increasing asymmetry in political inuences in the CET decision making)
may actually lower CET if " < 0, i.e., if country A has a government that puts less weight
on rms' prots than country B.
Proposition 1 implies that, in the absence of economic asymmetries, the minimum value
of CET t is attained at  = 1=2 when " = 0. Let us now examine at what value of  CET
is minimized in the presence of economic asymmetry. In particular, suppose SA(t)  nSB(t)
where n > 1 (n < 1) implies that country A is bigger (smaller) economically than country












B < 0, then the above expression is negative if and only if n > 1. In fact, from (4), we
have [n + 1   ]S0
B =  [(1 + ")(hA) + (1   )(1   ")(hB)]0 < 0. Thus, S0
B is indeed
negative. Therefore, the above expression is negative if and only if n > 1. It then follows that
if we allow economic asymmetry in proposition 1, the value of CET will attain its minimum
at a value of  which is more (less) than 1=2 if n > 1 (n < 1). That is, if the larger of the two
country's initial inuence in the CU decision-making was somewhat more than that of the
smaller country, then moving toward symmetry in their relative inuences would increase
the equilibrium level of the CET. Equivalently, if the smaller country has a relatively smaller
inuence initially, then moving toward symmetry would increase the equilibrium level of the
CET. Formally,
10Proposition 2 Suppose (h) = h with  2 (0;1), " = 0, and the two member countries are
economically asymmetric. Starting from a situation where the bigger (smaller) country has
a relatively somewhat higher (lower) inuence in the CET decision-making, a move toward
political symmetry would increase the equilibrium level of the CET.
For any given , when n exceeds unity, country A's eciency loss S0
A(t) is amplied in
equation (4). This enhanced eciency loss tends to moderate the equilibrium level of the
CET. The larger country A is relative to country B (i.e., the higher n is), the stronger is this
eect and the lower the CET. Analogously, starting from an n which exceeds unity, raising
 from 1=2 confers a greater weight to the nation which suers the greater eciency loss.
This tends to moderate the CET. Put dierently, when country A is economically larger
than country B, a reduction in  starting from a value greater than 1=2 (i.e., a move toward
greater political symmetry) can raise the CET. In this latter scenario, reducing the weight
given to country A is equivalent to ignoring (albeit partially) the disproportionate eciency
losses that the larger nation incurs. Consequently, the CET rises.
We conclude this section by noting how the results would change if the function (),
representing the extra weight each CU member government attaches to the net income of
the lobby group, was convex rather than concave as has been assumed in this paper. First of
all, note that when () is convex, the lobby groups objective function is also convex in the
lobby levels. Therefore, the rst order condition (7) gives the minima in the optimization
problem. For the maxima, one has to look at the two corner solutions. The rst corner is
given by the solution when lobbying does not take place at all. The other corner corresponds
to an accumulation of lobbying in only one country, and this would be the country which
has a higher inuence on the CU decision-making. If the rst corner yields a higher value of
the objective function, then an increase in political asymmetry would have no eect on the
equilibrium level of the CET. If, on the other hand, the solution is at the other corner, then
11an increase in the level of political asymmetry ( a higher level for ) would imply a higher
level of the equilibrium level of the CET.
4 Some Modications of the Basic Model
In this section we shall consider two modications of the preceding analysis. In the rst,
we rule out cross-border lobbying. Next consider the case where the lobby groups act non-
cooperatively. These two cases will be considered separately in the following two sub-sections.
4.1 No Cross-border Lobbying
We shall continue to use the notations hA and hB for lobbying by rms in country A and B
respectively. However, in this subsection, rms in a country only lobby the government in
that country. Therefore, each government's objective function will be somewhat dierent,
and it will in particular not depend on the income of the lobby group in a dierent country.
That is, the objective function of the government in country i is given by
G
i = Si(t)   hi + 
i[i(t)   h
i]; i = A;B; (12)
but the objective function of the CU authority remains the same as before, and that is
max
t G
CU   G
A(t;hA;hB;h
A;h









A(t) + (1   )S
0
B(t) + (1 + ")
0
A(t)(h
A) + (1   )(1   ")
0
B(t)(h
B) = 0: (13)
As in the previous section, we examine the eect of political asymmetries | that is,
changes in the parameters  and " on the equilibrium level of the CET t. However, in order
to focus on political asymmetry we make assumptions that eliminate asymmetries elsewhere;
12in particular, we assume that A(t) = B(t) = (t) and SA(t) = SB(t) = S(t). Because of
these assumptions, from (3), (5), and (7), we determine that
(1 + ")
0(h
A) = (1   )(1   ")
0(h
B): (14)
Since (14) is the same as (8), lemma 1 will continue to hold in this subsection.
Dierentiating (13) and using (14) yields:
~ 
0(t)




B] + [(1   ")(h





where ~  = S00
A + (1   )S00
B + (1 + ")00
A(hA) + (1   )(1   ")00
B(hB) < 0.
If the initial equilibrium is symmetric (i.e.,  = 1=2 and " = 0 so that hA = hB), an
increase in  or " will increase t if and only if it also increases the total amount of lobbying. If
the initial equilibrium is not symmetric, and in particular if hA > hB (or, because of lemma
1, equivalently,  > 1=2), an increase in  or " has a direct eect given by the second and
the third terms in (15), which is to increase t. The indirect eect as a result of changes in
the total amount of lobbying is positively related to the size of changes in the total amount
of lobbying.
Finally, dierentiating (7) and using (7), (14), and (15), we obtain changes in hA, hB,
and hA + hB. Derivations of these expressions are given in Appendix I.
From equations (II.1)-(II.6) and assumption 3 in Appendix II, we nd that:
dhA
d















   =1=2
"=0
< 0:
That is, starting with complete symmetry, an increase in either  or " unambiguously in-
creases hA and decreases hB. An increase in a country's inuence in CU-wide decision-making
13or in that country's susceptibility to lobbying increases lobbying received by that country
and reduces lobbying received by the other country. This is expected. However, in the pres-
ence of initial asymmetry, this result may not hold because of the diminishing returns from
lobbying activities. If one country has much more inuence in the CU than the other, that
country will naturally receive more lobbying. However, if it becomes even more inuential,
then the return to lobbying eorts in this country will be minimal and the eorts of lobby
groups will be better directed at the other country. Thus, it is possible that an increase in
 can reduce hA under asymmetry. Similar arguments apply for changes in ". However, this





















for all values of  2 (0;1).
As for the eects on the total amount of lobbying (i.e., hA +hB) of an increase in  (the




































and then from (15) that
dt
d
   =1=2
"=0
= 0:
6In an earlier version of the paper in which we assumed the production technologies to be of the Leontief
type with sector-specic capital stocks, 00 was equal to zero (see Bandyopadhyay et al., 2007).
14That is, starting with a symmetric equilibrium, an increase in  has no eect on the total
amount of lobbying and thus on the CET. However, if the initial equilibrium is not symmetric
| in particular, if  > 1=2 | it follows from assumption 1 and lemma 1 that the rst eect
on the right-hand side of the above equation is positive: the increase in hA dominates the
decrease in hB when the initial level of hA is higher. The second eect, which takes into
account the diminishing returns to lobbying, can be either positive or negative depending
on the degree of concavity of the lobbying function and on the initial level of .
Turning now to the eect on CET, substituting (II.5) and (II.6) into (15) and using (7)
and (14) yields:
 ~ 
0  dt = 4(
0)





A)   (1   ")(h
B)g d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)(h
B)g d"
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Focusing on the eect of , and assuming pro tempore " = 0, it follows from lemma 1
that the rst eect of an increase in  is positive (negative) if and only if  > 1=2 (  < 1=2).










With this functional form of , it can be veried that the second eect is positive (negative)
if  > 1=2 ( < 1=2). That is, when (h) = h with  2 (0;1), the equilibrium value of CET
is a U-shaped function of  and it takes the minimum value for  = 1=2. Formally:
Proposition 3 When (h) = h with  2 (0;1) and " = 0, an increase in asymmetry in
15political inuences of the two member countries (i.e., either an increase in  from  > 1=2
or a decrease in  from  < 1=2) will unambiguously increase the equilibrium value of the
CET.
Similar conclusions can be drawn in much the same way for asymmetry with respect to
the susceptibility parameter " when  = 1=2.
Why political asymmetry increases CET is best explained by looking at the condition


















A)   (1   )(1   ")(h
B)g:
Clearly, an increase in  will increase the equilibrium value of t if it also increases GCU
t .
One of the components of the eect of an increase in  on GCU
t is 0f(1 + ")(hA)   (1  
)(1   ")(hB)g d. From lemma 1 it follows that this component is always positive for all
 6= 1=2, and this in part explains why asymmetry increases the equilibrium value of t.
We conclude this section by noting a property of the equilibrium CET. We have already
shown that GA
t   GB
t = 0f(1 + ")(hA)   (1   )(1   ")(hB)g. Therefore, if  > 1=2,
using lemma 1 we can say that GA
t   GB
t > 0. Furthermore, at the equilibrium GCU
t = 0,
and thus from (17) we have GB
t +(GA
t  GB




t is also equal to zero at the equilibrium (see (17)), GA
t must be
positive. Combining these observations and assuming both GA and GB to be concave in t,
we can conclude that when  > 1=2, the equilibrium value of t is lower (higher) than what
country A (B) would desire. This result is stated formally below.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the two countries do not have the same inuence in the CU
decision-making. The more (less) inuential member country would have preferred a higher
(lower) value of the CET than the equilibrium one.
16The equilibrium value of the CET is a compromise and the above proposition states the
direction of the compromise for the dierent members.
4.2 Non-cooperative Lobbying
In the previous section, we assumed that the lobby groups in the two member countries
cooperate and lobby jointly. In contrast, in this section we consider a situation where the
two lobby groups do not cooperate and lobby individually. The economic intuitions between
the various results are similar to the ones in the previous section; therefore, in this section
we simply present the formal results without explaining them intuitively. For brevity, we
also consider only one type of asymmetry and assume " = 0.
Let hij (i = j = A;B) be the amount of lobbying by the rm in country i on the
government of country j. Net prots of the rm in country i are given by
~ i = i(t)   hiA   hiB; i = A;B: (18)
Since lobbying now is done by the two rms individually and without cooperation, the
objective functions of the two governments and the CU authority are:
G
A = SA(t)   hAA   hAB + (hAA)~ A + (hBA)~ B; (19)
G
B = SB(t)   hBA   hBB + (hAB)~ A + (hBB)~ B; (20)
G
CU = G
A + (1   )G
B: (21)
In stage 2 of the game, the CU authority maximizes GCU with respect to t, giving rise
















B = 0: (22)











































The levels of lobbying are determined in the rst stage by the two non-cooperating lobby
































  1 = 0;




2 (hAA) =  ^ ; (1   )(
0
A)




2 (hBA) =  ^ ; (1   )(
0
B)
2 (hBB) =  ^ : (24)
As before, we focus on political asymmetry |  6= 1=2 | and assume symmetry else-
where; in particular, we assume that A(t) = B(t) = (t) and SA(t) = SB(t) = S(t).
Given these assumptions, from (23) and (24) it immediately follows that for all values of
 2 (0;1) the equilibrium must satisfy
hAA = hBA; hAB = hBB:




0(t) + 2(1   )(hBB)








0(hBB) =  ^ ; (27)
in three unknowns t, hAA, and hBB, where ~  also simplies to
^  = S
00(t) + 2(hAA)
00(t) + 2(1   )(hBB)
00(t):
Note that from (26) and (27), we derive

0(hAA) = (1   )
0(hBB): (28)
Dierentiating (25) and using (28), we nd
~ 
20  dt =  [(hAA)   (hBB)] d   
0(hAA) d(hAA + hBB): (29)
Now, dierentiating (26) and (27) and using (28) and (29), we obtain changes in hAA,
hBB and hAA + hBB. These are given in Appendix III.



















   
=1=2
= 0; (30)
and then all results derived in the previous section also hold here.
The main reason for obtaining the same qualitative result for cooperative and non-
cooperative lobbying is the property of the equilibrium in the non-cooperative case that
each government receives the same amount of lobbying from the two rms in two dierent
member countries (i.e., hAA = hBA; hAB = hBB). This result follows from our assumption
that a government responds equally to lobbying from the two rms; that is, the functional
form of the () function is not rm specic.
195 Conclusion
The eect of lobbying | domestic and cross-border | depends on two factors: (i) the more
easily a government may be convinced through lobbying (say, susceptibility of a government),
the greater is the eect; and (ii) the greater the power/inuence of a government (and its
representative) on the central tari-making body, the higher is the eect of lobbying that
government. The dierences between the member governments in these two factors are at the
heart of this paper. We examine the eect of asymmetries between the member governments
in the eects of lobbying on the equilibrium level of the CET.
We nd a positive monotonic relationship between the degrees of asymmetry and the
level of the CET. For equal susceptibilities, a greater relative power of a member nation's
government monotonically raises the CET. On the other hand, for equal power, a rise in
the spread of the susceptibilities must also monotonically raise the tari. The qualitative
message of the central results oered in sections 2 and 3 continue to be supported when we
relax the structure of the basic model. In the last part of section 3 we relax the assumption
of economic symmetry and derive some interesting results which we present in proposition 2.
These extend and complement proposition 1. Furthermore, section 4 considers two dierent
variants of the model. In the rst, we rule out cross border lobbying, while in the second, we
allow for the lobby groups in the two nations to engage in non-cooperative behavior. Our
results continue to be supported.
Our ndings have the interesting policy implication that more heterogeneous CUs are
likely to be more protectionist with respect to non-members. They also imply that when
considering expansion of a CU, free trade{oriented members should be less sympathetic to
bringing in dissimilar new entrants.
20Appendix I
From (8)
(1   )(1   )
00(h
B)dh
B = (1 + )
00(h
A)dh
A + [(1 + )
0(h






B = F dh
A +
(1 + )0(hA) + (1   )0(hB)





(1   )2(1   )00(hB)
d using (8); (I.2)
where
F = 1 +
(1 + )00(hA)
(1   )(1   )00(hB)
> 0:
Dierentiating (10) and then using (8), we get:
 dh





2000(1 + )(hA) + s000
A + (1   )S000













Substituting dhA from (I.3) into the right hand side of (I.2), we get
[1 + FD] d(h
A + h




(1   )2(1   )00(hB)

d: (I.4)







































































Dierentiating (7) and using (7), (14), and (15) and ignoring third-order derivatives of f
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We assume the second-order condition for the lobby group's optimization problem to be
satised. That is,
Assumption 3 CU
hAhA < 0; CU
hBhB < 0 and  > 0.
Appendix III

















where A1 =  600f(hAA) (hBB)g+ ^ = and A2 =  600f(hAA) (hBB)g  ^ =(1 ).










































































The second-order conditions and the stability of the rst-stage Nash equilibrium are assumed
to be satised. That is,
Assumption 4 6000(hAA)+(0)200(hAA) < 0, 6000(hAA)+(1 )(0)200(hBB) < 0,
and ~  > 0.
25References
[1] Abrego, L., R.G. Riezman and J. Whalley, 2006, How Often are Propositions on the
Eects of Regional Trade Agreements Theoretical Curiosa? Journal of International
Economics, 68, 59-78.
[2] Bandyopadhyay, S. and H.J. Wall, 1999, Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role
of Political Asymmetries, Review of International Economics, 7, 665-72.
[3] Bandyopadhyay, S., S. Lahiri and S. Roy, 2007, Political Asymmetry and Common
External Tari in a Customs Union, Working Paper #2007-038A, Research Division,
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.
[4] Bhagwati, J.N., 1982, Directly Unproductive Prot-Seeking (DUP) Activities, Journal
of Political Economy, 90, 988-1002.
[5] Bond, E.W., R.G. Riezman and C. Syropoulos, 2004, Strategic and Welfare Theoretic
Analysis of Free Trade Areas, Journal of International Economics, 64, 1-27.
[6] Cadot, O., J. de Melo and M. Olarreaga, 1999, Regional Integration and Lobbying for
Taris against Nonmembers, International Economic Review, 40, 635-657.
[7] Findlay, R. and S. Wellisz, 1982, Endogenous Taris and the Political Economy of
Trade Restrictions and Welfare, in J. Bhagwati, ed., Import Competition and Response,
Chicago: University of Chicago.
[8] Gatsios, K. and L. Karp, 1991, Delegation Games in Customs Unions, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 58, 391-397.
[9] Gatsios, K. and L. Karp, 1995, Delegation in a General Equilibrium Model of Customs
Unions, European Economic Review, 39, 319-33.
26[10] Gawande, K., P. Krishna and M. Robbins, 2006, Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 88, 563-71.
[11] Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, 1994, Protection for Sale, American Economic Review
84, 833-50.
[12] Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, 1995, The Politics of Free Trade Agreements, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 85, 667-90.
[13] Hillman, A.L., 1982, Declining Industries and Political-support Protectionist Motives,
American Economic Review, 72, 1180-87.
[14] Krishna, P., 1998, Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 227-251.
[15] Magee. S.P., W.A. Brock, and L. Young, 1989, Black hole taris and endogenous policy
theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[16] Melatos, M. and A.D. Woodland, Alan, 2007a, Endogenous trade bloc formation in an
asymmetric world, European Economic Review, 51, 901-24.
[17] Melatos, Mark and A.D. Woodland, 2007b, Pareto-optimal Delegation in Customs
Unions, Review of International Economics, 15, 441-61.
[18] Panagariya, A. and R. Findlay, 1996, A Political Economy Analysis of Free Trade Areas
and Customs Unions, in Feenstra, R.C., G.M. Grossman and D.A. Irwin, eds., The
Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
[19] Raimondos-Mller, P. and A.D. Woodland, 2006, Non-Preferential Trading Clubs, Jour-
nal of International Economics, 68, 79-91.
27[20] Richardson, M., 1994, Customs Unions and Domestic Taxes, Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, 27, 537-50.
[21] Riezman, R.G., 1979, A 3x3 Model of Customs Unions, Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 9, 341-54..
[22] Rodrik, D., 1995, Political Economy of Trade Policy, Chapter 28 in G.M. Grossman and
K. Rogo, eds., Handbook of International Economics, Volume 3, 1457-94, Amsterdam:
Elsevier Science.
[23] Saggi, K., 2006, Preferential Trade Agreements and Multilateral Tari Cooperation,
International Economic Review, 47, 29-57.
[24] Schi, M. and L.A. Winters, 2003, Regional Integration and Development, World Bank,
Oxford University Press.
[25] Viner, J., 1950, The Customs Unions Issue, New York: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace.
28